My strongest memories of reading about Henry's in action (as opposed to seeing reenactors using them) come from two incidents reported in part 2 of Vol. 37, Series I in the ORs [I think that's the reference]. One mentions the number of such rifles captured from Kautz's cavalry in their raids around Richmond in June, 1864. Another mentions a sudden shortage of Henry ammo in the defense of Washington a day or two before the Sixth Corps appeared. In the first instance rapid fire led to the capture of cavalrymen; in the second it embarrassed the ordnance personnel tasked with supplying the polyglot forces defending the capital.
Originally Posted by 44 Henry
I think your example from Bentonville illustrates how this might play out in real life. 10,000 rounds for 23 reenactors over three days works out to about 435 rounds per reenactor, or 145 per reenactor per day. Do you have any information on how the army's logisticians managed to cope with this extreme demand in practice, or did it often end with captures and shortages?
I noted too that Kautz considered the weapon not quite on a par with the 7-shot Spencer, which seemed to have its own issues.
Another question: if the weapon was so revolutionary, why did the army never adopt it? Was it just conservatism, or did they have concerns about low powered rounds, jams, short range, the tubular magazine, and wasted ammo?
Your article does a very good job of compiling a large number of quotes about the Henry, but it doesn't really address the larger issues involved in deploying and supporting one of several novel weapons that appeared during the war.
M. A. Schaffner
Midstream Regressive Complainer