Napoleonic vs Civil War

[billwatson2]

Picking up on posts regarding our (lack of) understanding and facts about what I'll soon start calling the "myth of Civil War tactical stupidity in the face of more accurate, longer-ranged rifle muskets," I took my own advice and started compiling statistics from Napoleonic wars and battles in the Civil War. Here's one sample:

Waterloo
190,000 engaged
55,600 killed or wounded
29.3 percent

Gettysburg
165,620 engaged
35,087 killed or wounded
21.1 percent

I'm just throwing that one out there as an example. I've done a dozen battles so far and it appears "our" war wasn't bloodier.

None of the numbers I'm using come from anyone trying to make a point about deadliness. It's just numbers, a lot of which still need to be doublechecked.

Research. What a concept.

[Jubilo]

Dear Captain Watson,
Did you get any figures for that little scrap called "Borodino?" Paddy Grffith's Battle Tactics of the Civil War," concluded that ours was the last Napoleonic war. Most firefights and artillery were fought at 100 yards or less. Hesse also has a book out on the the subject. Tactics evolved during the war and more repeating weapons were used but the good old frontal assaults held on.
all for theold flag,
David Corbett

[billwatson2]

Dave, Borodino is on my 'to do' list.

[flattop32355]

Bill, one thing to keep in mind is that, the further back you go, the more you'll run into battles where one side is routed and then the mass killing begins during that part of the fighting. That somewhat skews the statistics, as that rarely happened, if at all, on any scale in the CW.

[bob 125th nysvi]

anything you want. What did my statistics professor tell me; "Figures lie and liars figure." (and Bill I am NOT calling you anything).

There are a whole lot of difference in terrain (European battlefields tended to be more open), tactics (artillery for example was deployed closure to the MLR in Nappy's day than in Lee's), deployment of cavalry, etc, etc etc that could have been factors in what happened and why that never show in in mere number.

I think the only thing you can say conclusively about 'long range rifle fire' and its effect on tactics is that tactics evolved in the face of that fire from march up and shoot at close range to entrench on defense and deploy more often in open order on offense.

The officers went into the CW expecting one type of battle, found themselves facing a different battle due to technical improvements and then adapted to those differences over time.

For example I could counter your statistics by pointing out that at Picket's Charge, Cold Harbor or Franklin, commanders who should have known better given that they had all taken advantages in the increases in defensive firepower, made major tactical blunders on the level with Ney at Waterloo.

You always start out fighting the last war and end up winning by being the first to learn and apply the lessons that the new war has taught you.

[Artyman]

And there is of course the numbers of wounded who die from the wounds after the war is over, the vaporized dead who go listed as MIA, those who just run away and never come back.

Anyhow, I have studied comparisons between WWI, WWII, Korea, and the ACW. What I see in battle after battle is the question of how could ACW generals do anything different than they did considering the limits of communication and the masses of troops brought to bear and considering also the reality that more modern generals have done the very same thing. The Nips charged in waves, so did the Russians and often the Germans. What about US hitting the beaches or assaulting Monte Casino? Waves of men charging into modern weapon concentrations did not end at Appomattox! Heck, we did it in Viet Nam at Hamburger Hill and the NVA at us about every battle.

I don't think sending in a rifle squad supported by artillery, using infiltration and concealment would have made any difference at the Wilderness, Gettysburg, etc.

Harry

[billwatson2]

Yup. Keep in mind the objective is just understanding. As with the slavery issue, there's a lot in play in tactics and weapons. Perhaps what I'm after is just a shattering of "convenient misunderstandings" on our part? I dunno. First stage in any project like this is just gathering information. Then we'll see if it takes us anywhere worth going.

[1stSgt45PVI]

Ok Napoleonic tactics I can understand, the use of smoothbore muskets and minimal Rifle technology, massing of firepower, Napoleons favourited attack in Column all helped constitute their stratagem. What about the Crimean War? Couldn't it be really the 1st real use of the Minne' Ball and trench warfare etc. on a grand scale? It was racked w/ logistical issues, lack of proper equipment, still used antiquated tactics, lack of proper clothing etc.

The above are all similar to issues we had through-out, and over came and learned and adapted too. IMHO instead of McClellan reporting on things he should have, he reported on things that really didn't help us much as an observer. He could have @ least given us a head start!

Figures are approx. such:
Britain, France, Ottomans VS Russia & her Allies

Allied Total: 1,000,000
400,000 French
300,000 Ottoman
250,000 British
15,000 Sardinians
4,250 German legion
2,200 Swiss legion
2,000 Italian legion
1,500 Polish legion

Russian Allies Total: 730,000
700,000 Russians
15,000 Montenegrin legion
7,000 Bulgarian Legion
6,000 Serbian-Macedonian Legion
1,000 Greek legion

Allied Casualties:
374,600 total dead
Ottoman: total dead est. 175,300
French: 100,000 of which 10,240 killed in action; 20,000 died of wounds; 70,000 died of disease
British: 2,755 killed in action; 2,019 died of wounds; 16,323 died of disease.
Sardinians: 36 casualties
Italians: 2,050 died from all causes, total dead est. 50,000

Russian Allies Casualties:
143,000 total dead:
25,000 killed in action
16,000 died of wounds
89,000 died of disease

[RJSamp]

There are a whole lot of difference in terrain (European battlefields tended to be more open), tactics (artillery for example was deployed closure to the MLR in Nappy's day than in Lee's), deployment of cavalry, etc, etc etc that could have been factors in what happened and why that never show in in mere number.

Now that's extremely debateable.....'open' if of course a relative term....and even varies on battlefields....the stone farm villages\houses every klick or three in Europe were tough for invading forces in 1805 as well as WWII....and I know that the spectre of assaulting from wood lot to village to behind the ridge concealment\hull down tactics has been a daunting tactical exercise for military planners in the modern era as well (nothing like Stingers, WireGuided missiles, NOE Helicopter's, and CHOBHAM\reactive armored AFV's duking it out in the Fulda Gap....).

Artillery had improved in the ACW over Napoleon....not radically, but there had been improvements....enough that between the rifled Minie balls, improved munitions, and 3" ordnance rifles: close in artillery support could wreak havoc on offensive artillery moving up with the cavalry to try to employ grape to break down a square...

Battlefields that might be considered relatively open (Gaines Mills, 1st and 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Cedar Mountain, Gettysburg, Antietam, Malvern Hill, Missionary Ridge, Champions Hill, Corinth, Iuka, Westport, Marais des Cygnes, Prairie Grove, et al) would have a number of closed terrain tactical obstacles.....and of course breastworks rendered all of this moot by 1864. They weren't all Chickamauga, Rich Mountain, South Mountain, Wilderness, Kennessaw, Raymond, Shiloh, Lookout Mountain.....

I hear you on the more wooded terrain of the America's....but in most cases that didn't hinder the sweep of battle lines and tactics.... and explains why Eastern Cavalry used Poinsett's double rank cavalry tactics, while out west they tended to use Cooke's single rank cavalry tactics....as explained in both Kidd's Michigan Cavalry book and the 6th US Cavalry Book (Common Soldier, Uncommon War or something like that, I'm on the couch at present sipping coffee)...the single rank out East could stretch to the next county and be impossible to have control over the unseen flank companies.....so deploying in two ranks was a necessity out East....

[bob 125th nysvi]

I admit that there were obstacles on European battlefields but in most cases nothing compared to the wilderness America actually was in the 1860s. The European road system was better developed, Berlin is as close to Moscow as NYC is to Chicago etc.

Waterloo vs. Gettysburg (Bill's Example) were probably pretty close in difficultly as far obstacles were concerned as both battles were fought in relatively well developed (for the time) areas. You certainly can't say that for the Wilderness or anywhere more than 5 miles outside of city west of the Appalachians.

The other thing is that Nappy and company really had not progressed much beyond the "push of the pike" tactically. Battles were still decided by cold steel and cavalry pursuit in Europe. The basic objective was to get with in 80 paces deliver a volley or two, disorder the enemy, push home with the bayonet and pursue with the saber. The guys who fought Agincourt probably could have adapted fairly quickly to Nappy's form of warfare.

Hollywood not withstanding less than 10% of the casualties in the CW were inflicted with edged weapons, can't say that about Waterloo.

And wouldn't Nappy have loved to have had a couple batteries of Parrot guns to level Hougemount with at long distance instead of trying to pry the British out with the bayonet?

Even in the Crimea tactics were much more reminiscent of Nappy the first than the post CW European wars.

I think the studies have shown that the majority of small arms damage done during the CW was between 105 and 125 yards, ragged edge for a smoothbore but well within the killing range of a rifle. And I don't remember if any of those studies differentiated by year.

The amateurs (and maybe even most of the professionals) who fought the war and learned on the go were not taught to extend the killing range of their infantry firepower out to extended ranges. Pre-War drill was ABOUT drill not tactics, looking smart was a lot more important than being tactical.

So the misuse or ineffective use of technology (at least early in the conflict) is extremely understandable as no one knew what changes technology had brought to the battlefield.

You also have the issue (already pointed out) that due to technological limitations CW commanders were extremely limited in their options tactically and operationally.

All in all, it is no disservice to the officers (and men) who fought the war to say that tactical blunders, which with hindsight are perfectly obvious to us today, occurred on a fairly frequent basis and some of them were down right stupid.

Everybody has to learn.

In many ways the start of the CW was very reminiscent to the start of WWI from a tactical and technological standpoint. The technology was there but not fully understood. The tactics to deal with that technology existed on paper but like all playbooks you don't know what does or does not work until you get into the game.

So stupid and brutal mistakes were made but not because the leaders were brutal or stupid but because they did not have the prerequisite knowledge to avoid making those mistakes. Once they learned from their mistakes for the most part they worked hard to avoid repeating them.

One reason that the CW did not degenerate into the bloodbath that WWI did on the western front is here in America the opportunity for strategic, operational and tactical mobility existed were as in France it did not.