Whose skirmishers are whose?

[flattop32355]

The "Starting a dismounted cav" thread partly ended up as a "What's the proper way to use skirmishers" thread.

It has always struck me that, if cavalry was present, and unless the opportunity to make a true, mounted cavalry charge was available, or they decided to withdraw fairly quickly, they would dismount, leave the #4's with the horses, and fight in loose order, similar to infantry skirmishers.

If and when infantry support became available, the cavalry would ultimately yield the field to the infantry, who would then throw out their own skirmish line, with each company/regiment/brigade using its own sub-units across its own front, according to how large the main formation was.

I am not familiar with any cases of an infantry company/regiment/brigade keeping its own men all back in line and relying on cavalry, either dismounted (having horses) or unmounted (not having any horses) as its main skirmish line.

Have I missed something?

It would seem reasonable that an infantry formation would choose to rely on its own men to ultimately form that skirmish line, as the officers know each other and have fought together, rather than to rely upon men from a different branch with whom they may not be as familiar in how they operate.

Specific to reenacting, it has been my experience that dismounted cavalry units tend to be somewhat fewer in number, and with smaller numbers of men per unit, than are infantry units, and are armed differently than most infantry units, making it harder to consolidate either into an infantry unit or as their own, larger unit able to take its place on the battle line.

That would seem to me to be the main reasons why at reenactments they are generally relegated to early skirmish line work, or shunted off to the flanks (both of which, ironically, seem to be main functions of cavalry in reality: Hold the line 'til the infantry shows up, and guard the flanks of the line of battle).

[Rob Weaver]

Cavalry should fix the enemy and make him deploy, and hold him long enough for the infantry to take over. This is, I think< called a "delay." After the fight becomes developed, cavalry ride off to the flanks and rear. They become useful again in the pursuit phase, keeping steady pressure on the disorganized and defeated enemy. Seminary Ridge at Gettysburg offers a good example of a delay, while Custer's work at Cedar Creek is a great example of a pursuit.
Last year, we worked with a mounted cavalry company out of Ohio someplace. They dismounted and advanced in a skirmish line, engaging the Confederates. When the fight had developed, the infantry, deployed and passed through the cavalry, who retired to the rear. While the infantry had the opposing line fixed in place, the cavalry mounted and passed to the left behind the next terrain feature, a prominent wooded hill. They reappeared in the Confederate left rear and became the broom, sweeping the Confederate line towrd the infantry dustpan. Most of the Confederates were "gobbled." I think in all my years, it was the best use of the combined arms of infantry and cavalry that I've ever participated in.
Now last Friday at Gettysburg was a typical reenactor blunder. There was a cavalry skirmish line thrown out in front of the infantry. The COnfederates came over the hill, and the cavalry engaged in place. A skirmish line vs an infantry line - and their own line less than 50 yards away. They stayed and fought it out. In my rarely to be confused with humble opinion, they should have been gone at least 5 minutes before they even though of retiring. As it was, they stayed behnd to become decisively engaged. Once the Confederates deployed over the hill, and headed in our direction - Katy bar the door, it was an infantry fight.

[Robert A Mosher]

Both of you offer some very valid observations. Based upon the ideas and principles inherited from the Napoleonic era, a commander at any level will want to consider having as much as one third of his own force commited to the role of pickets/vedettes/skirmishers/flank, advance, and rear guards. This includes those actually deployed as well as those positioned nearby as supports, reserves, and reliefs for those units/personnel deployed. He could reduce this number when part of a larger force as each friendly element would also have out its own guards and skirmishers.

Skirmishers are primarily deployed to fight skirmishers (or to harass the enemy main body if they actually manage to get close enough to it). When an enemy main force element is close enough to see and engage your own main force element, the skirmishers' job is to get out of the way so as not to interfere with the main body's maneuver and fire. The withdrawing skirmishers will either move to the unengaged flanks of the friendly force, move to the rear of the friendly force to become a reserve, or fall in with the main friendly force.

Robert A. Mosher

[7thNJcoA]

One of the best things about cavalry is they have horses! This gives them the ability to redeploy quickly on the battlefield unlike the infantry who can only move as fast as the slowest man. The delay tactic is the forerunner or modern "fix and flank" tactics. After the infantry has taken over the Cavalry can now jump in the saddle and ride to an unsupported flank or re enforce a weak point in the line. The whole point is to screen the enemy and deploy (dismount) in a place where they can hold long enough for infantry support to come up or for the lines to deploy into a defensive posture. I really enjoy the discussions on the forums about tactics of all types! If I only had the property for a horse I would be a cavalryman too...

[Curt-Heinrich Schmidt]

Hallo!

IMHO...

I think that is a good question, but that the reality of history or historical correctness is
greatly hurt by the combination of:

1. lack of historical knowledge of "cavalry"

2. events with limited space and condensed fields of action, and the need to keep the "action" in front of a spectating public

3. the contributions that Reenacting Culture play on what cavalry units can actually do and contribute in emulation of the CW experience versus
how event hosts and commanders know to use them (within the limits of reenacting, safety, etc., etc.,)

4. Reenacting Tradition, and Expectations, where for all of the time, money, and expense involved with a mounted impression would a unit be "happy" with "scouting" when they know where the "enemy" is, and not necessarily get "powder time" and "sabre clinking" time?

Not a negative or criticism of cavalry, just trying to balance what happens when one tries to put increasing history in the same bottle with the modern realities and culture of reenactment simulation and emulation- and shake it up.

CHS

[7thNJcoA]

I agree with you on those points. I know in a hobby as expensive as ours can be, that when you get to an event and are held in reserve during a battle and only get to fire 3 shots until it is over it can be frustrating knowing you took the time out of your schedule and spent your hard earned cash to get the gear and to get to the event pay the registration fees and some of the other expenses. Cavalry guys do pay the highest price for their impression. I have seen some Cavalry used for scouting during tacticals but there is always that problem with limited field of movement. I just cant stand to see the pistoleros that run around with 6 pistols and a henry!

[Yellowhammer Rebel]

I just cant stand to see the pistoleros that run around with 6 pistols and a henry!

Ya especially one that does a Confederate impression. Just goes to show that all those kind of people want to do is "cowboy it up."

On a side note. I have seen Henry's used by an infantry unit on the field and that is an awesome sight. I would not have wanted to run into them in the real war.:eek:

[bob 125th nysvi]

that we have a major problem in the training of officers and NCOs handling the skirmish function.

First a lot of officers don't like throwing out a skirmish line, they have few enough men under their command as it is (different topic boys) that if they throw out a skirmish line they now have a 10 man company so they just don't do it.

Secondly, a lot of units don't know how to skirmish. They throw out a bunch of guys who form a line about 3 yards apart in a straight line walking and talking. Skirmishers are supposed to be deployed in groups of 4 (at least one NCO in every two groups) that are deployed two up and two back and moving in what is called in modern terms "bounding".

Third, a lot of skirmishers don't know how to do their jobs. The job isn't to be a "MLR" light. It is to advance and help the officers develop a picture of the enemy deployment. Keep going if you can brush aside an enemy skirmish line, and fall back with information if you contact a significant enemy force.

And get the heck out of the way, or reform with your parent unit when the fur starts to fly.

Now infantry does that in the 50 to 100 yard zone in front of the main unit.

Cavalry does some similar things but farther out. This is because of their mobility. They get out about a mile in advance to develop the situation and send back information.

Battlefield compression is a real problem for reenactors and I think this is one reason why dismounted cavalry (and cavalry in general) does not have a great reputation in the reenacting community. Not only are our spaces too close but let's face it, 5 or 10 guys mounted isn't a cavalry "charge".

And believe me I know all about horses, I got them, I know all about the care and maintenance (and for you dis-mounted guys it is more than half of the real soldiers job) which is WHY I choose not to do the cavalry impression. But I also know that once you have done a mounted cavalry impression you know how far from reality a dis-mounted impression really is.

[Dave Myrick]

Bernie,
To answer your question accurately would depend on the tactical situation. This includes an examination of the terrain involved, the mission and the weapons the troopers have available to them (ie stage of the war, early vs mid vs late).

No cavalry officer is going to give up his men's mobility unless absolutely necessary. Typically mounted vidette's would be posted with a reserve, very similar to an infantry picket post except they are not stationary, they are more like roving patrols to cover the ground. How many videttes, the size of the patrol area and the number in the reserve are dictated by the ground being observed. Behind the mounted reserve would be the main body of the cavalry force. They can be mounted or not, again depending on the tactical situation.
Once the vidette's make contact, word is sent back to the reserve and then to the company and so forth on the nature of the contact. If the contact is hostile and of sufficient force to repulse the vidette's, they are recalled. If the terrain is supportive, a mounted skirmish line is sent forward to contact. Keep in mind this skirmish line also has a mounted reserve ready to rush to the support of the skirmish line. It is possible to dismount the skirmish line, to enable them to better use terrain and weapons if tactically feasible. They are out there to develop the tactical situation for the commander. If they are driven in by the enemy force, they fall back upon the reserve and then back to their company/squadron. By now the main body is engaged. They can fight mounted or dismounted once again as the tactical situation dictates. They remain engaged until they are victorious, withdrawn or put to flight. The presence of friendly infantry in no way absolutely determines the actions of the cavalry force. Keep in mind those guys did not often work well together then. Sometimes they worked well together and others not so well and a detailed study of the cavalry is rife with examples of this. Keep in mind also the purpose of the skirmish line. Would you as an commander trust another outfit to do their jobs correctly when the defense of your command is at stake in a developing tactical scenario? Or would you prudently take precautions to protect your own men by throwing forward a body of skirmishers or pickets of your own?

Buford's defense in depth at Gettysburg is an example of an old Dragoon, adapting to the tactical and strategic situations of the day. His vidette's were out about 4 miles from his main line to give an example of how much room would be used in this type of defense. Kilpatrick and Gregg used much different tactics defending against Stuart's attempted end around over in the East Cavalry Field area of the battlefield. Both sides used mounted and dismounted to great affect in that engagement. Funkstown, Hagerstown and Boonesboro all saw varying degrees of cooperation between cavalry and infantry on both sides.

Indeed, a detailed study of the entire Gettusburg campaign from Brandy Station to Winchester, will open many eyes to the many and varied uses of and roles played by cavalry and infantry on both sides as well as how they were employed depending upon the tactical situation.

How do we accomplish this accurately on the reenacting field is something that I simply dont have the energy to tackle. Space available, numbers available, tactical ability, period tactical knowledge and competing egos all stand to throw nearly insurmountable, not totally but nearly, roadblocks into your path.

Hope this is useful,
Dave Myrick

[7thNJcoA]

Too many units do not realize that once deployed as skirmishers each cell commander usually an NCO takes over and the cell works independently firing and moving as directed. I laugh when I see the whole skirmish line advance at once that would be slaughter it is the basic fire and movement! Some units need to train their NCO's in tactics and stop promoting people to make them happy because they are power hungry! (different topic all together!)

[GrumpyDave]

Bernie, don't do it. You can't find historical documentation for 'renacterisms.


Back to the cat herd.

[Mint Julep]

Too many units do not realize that once deployed as skirmishers each cell commander usually an NCO takes over and the cell works independently firing and moving as directed. I laugh when I see the whole skirmish line advance at once that would be slaughter it is the basic fire and movement! Some units need to train their NCO's in tactics and stop promoting people to make them happy because they are power hungry! (different topic all together!)

Drew,

What drill manual are you using?

The line should advance, retreat, fire and cease fire as one. Skirmishers can even be wheeled in line.

If I found an NCO giving conflicting commands on the skirmish line I commanded, he might not be an NCO anymore.

The tactics of the day did permit a lot of independent thought. The commanding officer used the bugle to control his skirmishers to do what he wanted, not what they wanted. If the NCOs on the ground are making decisions, how do they know what is desired of them or what is going on with the other end of the brigade skirmish line? I have been on several skirmish lines where I could not see the other end of the line and could only dress on the line and move with them.

[bob 125th nysvi]

Drew,

What drill manual are you using?

The line should advance, retreat, fire and cease fire as one. Skirmishers can even be wheeled in line.

If I found an NCO giving conflicting commands on the skirmish line I commanded, he might not be an NCO anymore.

The tactics of the day did permit a lot of independent thought. The commanding officer used the bugle to control his skirmishers to do what he wanted, not what they wanted. If the NCOs on the ground are making decisions, how do they know what is desired of them or what is going on with the other end of the brigade skirmish line? I have been on several skirmish lines where I could not see the other end of the line and could only dress on the line and move with them.

I think you jumped the gun a little on this one.

Yes advance and retreat and even direction was the responsibility of the officer in charge of the unit but a skirmish line 50-100 yards out is really beyond his control in the sense that he could control a company in line.

However NCOs in charge of cells were expected to make command decisions with in their immediate sphere of influence.

Thus in moving forward the NCO would indicate how far he wanted his men spread out. When to conduct a tactical retreat (or advance) based on the situation in front of him (and without direct orders to the contrary) and when to send someone back with intelligence for his superiors.

You try to micro-manage at that distance and in the REAL CW army you wouldn't have your command for very long.

[Curt-Heinrich Schmidt]

Hallo!

In my heresies...

In brief and to over-generalize...

When a company is deployed forward or by the flank as skirmishers in front of a battalion, the direction is from the captain, over the two platoons in order to have the ability to move them "in any direction with the greatest prompitude."

However, the captain commands the movements after the deployment, the 1st and 3nd lieutenants with a bugler each (to repeat the captain's commands) can, with the sergeants, coordinate the two platoons and four sections.

When a battalion is deployed as skirmishers, the colonel will have "a general superintendence of the movement" with the major in command of the skirmish reserve, and the Lt. Colonel and Adjutant follow the deployment on the right and left, before falling back to the Colonel when the deployment is finished.

If during the deployment, the skirmishers are fired upon by the enemy, the captain has the ability to have the groups of four deploy as they gain proper distance.

Once deployed, the chiefs of sections position themselves 25 or 30 paces in the rear of the center of their sections. The captain, his bugler, and four bodyguards form the reserve are 80 paces behind the center of the line.

The only latitude lies in the men's ability to carry their arms and shoot them in a manner "most convenient" to them as the officers and NCO's see to it that the men economize effort, and take advantage of the terrain.

IMHO, NUG, "skirmishers" are often a handful or two of "dismounted cavalry" and unattached unit-less men, Sharpshooters, etc., with little or no knowledge or experience or desire in skirmish drill at the company level and so basically run out and sometimes pair off (or not) and leap-frog (or not) forward and back until the battle line of the enemy who has been ignoring them advances and starts the Ball.

IMHO, and bias, the highlight of my reenacting "career" was in command of the Confederate skirmish line under General King, at a Wilderness, as a battalion deployed as a skirmish line by the bugle.
The trees, ground clutter, and terrain made the skirmish line too long to see either end from the center, and difficult for mounted field officers and couriers to get through the wilderness- let alone the competition of several bugles on the left, center, and right.
And the CW experience of advancing a battalion-sized skirmish line to find and locate the Federals "out there somewhere" without knowing where they were or what part of the line one would find and where (or not) not being able to see more than a few dozen feet or so at a time.
Having found the Federal lines, the main Confederate lines advanced and attacked in, around, and through us as we fell back in the thickets and trees- making it impossible to assemble on the reserve and then take a place in the column at the rear of the companies ahead of us (as the attack was in progress and the formations lost in the wilderness).

Others' mileage will vary...

CHS

[bob 125th nysvi]

IMHO, and bias, the highlight of my reenacting "career" was in command of the Confederate skirmish line under General King, at a Wilderness, as a battalion deployed as a skirmish line by the bugle.
The trees, ground clutter, and terrain made the skirmish line too long to see either end from the center, and difficult for mounted field officers and couriers to get through the wilderness- let alone the competition of several bugles on the left, center, and right.
And the CW experience of advancing a battalion-sized skirmish line to find and locate the Federals "out there somewhere" without knowing where they were or what part of the line one would find and where (or not) not being able to see more than a few dozen feet or so at a time.
Having found the Federal lines, the main Confederate lines advanced and attacked in, around, and through us as we fell back in the thickets and trees- making it impossible to assemble on the reserve and then take a place in the column at the rear of the companies ahead of us (as the attack was in progress and the formations lost in the wilderness).

Others' mileage will vary...

CHS

Don't you think that happened quite often in real life too. Seems to me there was this whole major engagement called the Wilderness that just turned into a company/regimental fur ball no matter what the Brigade/Division/Corp commanders tried. And I'm fairly sure I remember a number of the line officers complaining after the fact that they couldn't control their men because they just disappeared into the woods around them.

Like them if we did it more, eventually we'd learn to do it right despite the confusion.

[7thNJcoA]

Drew,

What drill manual are you using?

The line should advance, retreat, fire and cease fire as one. Skirmishers can even be wheeled in line.

If I found an NCO giving conflicting commands on the skirmish line I commanded, he might not be an NCO anymore.

The tactics of the day did permit a lot of independent thought. The commanding officer used the bugle to control his skirmishers to do what he wanted, not what they wanted. If the NCOs on the ground are making decisions, how do they know what is desired of them or what is going on with the other end of the brigade skirmish line? I have been on several skirmish lines where I could not see the other end of the line and could only dress on the line and move with them.

Obviously not the same Hardees you are using maybe I got the bad one in the lot :confused: If I am wrong please correct me here asided from the forward, retreat movements how can the CPT control each individual cell? If I am wrong please tell me know how...

[flattop32355]

...asided from the forward, retreat movements how can the CPT control each individual cell?

If by "cell" you mean each set of Comrades In Arms = four men working together and in pairs, the commander of the skirmish line controls a lot.

He controls forward, backward, lateral and wheeling movements.
He controls when to fire and when to cease fire.
He controls how long the skirmish line is.
He controls deploying and consolidatiing the line.
He controls reenforcement of the line and replacement of casualties.
He controls defence against cavalry attack on the skirmish line.

His overall job is to oversee the entire skirmish line, as much as terrain and weather permits, and to use it to maximum effect. His orders are sent down the chain of command to be carried out by groups of two and four men working in concert to carry out his orders, under the supervision of NCO's familiar with the commanders orders.

Those Comrades In Arms/"cells" are not independent entities on the skirmish line; they are knit together by the direction of the commmander of the line, acting independently only within the confines of the orders given.

[Mint Julep]

Obviously not the same Hardees you are using maybe I got the bad one in the lot :confused: If I am wrong please correct me here asided from the forward, retreat movements how can the CPT control each individual cell? If I am wrong please tell me know how...

Well, obvioulsy not, because my Hardee's does not describe a "cell". It also does not say anywhere that an NCO may take charge of his cell and move it willy-nilly.


Halt.

78. At this command, briskly repeated, the line will halt. The chiefs of sections will promptly rectify any irregularity in the alignment and intervals, and after taking every possible advantage which the ground may offer for protecting the men, they, with the three sergeants in the line, will retire to their proper places in rear.

Now, does that sound like an NCO is advancing or retreating without regard or reference to the rest of the company? No, the section is aligned on the guides (the sergeants) with allowances for taking cover where available. Taking cover does not mean advancing out of line, though.

And that is just where the book opened (it happened to be bookmarked at the skirmish drill).

The capt maintains control and alignment through his sergeants and corporals. He tells them what to do. If he is out of voice range, he uses the bugle. I have manuevered by the bugle in skirmish order during battle when we could not hear orders and during demonstrations when we advanced over a ridge and out of sight of the commanding officer, who stood calmly before the crowd giving commands to his bugler.

I have been doing skirmish drill since 1980 and have given instruction in it for most of those intervening years and have never heard anyone suggest what you have.

Now, I'll repeat one of my favorite primary accounts from Yankee Tigers, by Ralsa Rice: He was told to move his company in skirmish order across an open field and hold a tree line on the opposite side. The firing was heavy across the field. Rice asked the commanding officer if he was required to move the company as per the drill manual or if he could do it on his hook. He was told the objective was the tree line, whatever it took. Rice huddled up his company, pointed out the treeline, told them it was every man for himself ... "GO!" and the entire company dashed pellmell across the field. They made it with no problems.

So, by the book isn't always the right way. But an NCO doesn't command until everyone above him is dead.

[Rob Weaver]

People have mentioned a couple things that contribute to bad reenactor skirmishing: Lack of knowledge of how and why to do it. Once you've fixed the enemy, it's time to get out! The commander above has to know when to sound "rally." Reenactor skirmishers stay too long. Perhaps because their impact is ignored. Nobody wants to die early in and engagement to the shot of a single picket.
I think the need to put on a "show" affects us more than we think. We're not trying to stay alive and defeat an enemy, we're trying to demonstrate something. Individual reenactors want trigger time; the public wants to see a show; even at non-spectator events we're still trying to put on a good show for each other. Banging away at an enemy you can barely see for a few minutes, to be recalled, marched off and lie in rifle pits for the rest of the day doesn't sound too appealing to most of us. We also have the restriction that the fight can't boil over into the next farm or there will be blood if not lawsuits. So we figure out how to put on a "show" on a "stage" that satisfies all participants. Except the ones that have a sneaking feeling it didn't look like that.
I remember a Cedar Creek a number of years ago, when we advanced past the Heater house with skirmishers 30 yards or so in front. The entire battalion crested the little hill and there were a million Confederates in front of us. The skirmishers were well deployed and the skirmish line well run, but as the wag next to me remarked: "What do you need em for? The Rebs are right there." And they were. And the skirmishers gave us no early warning or buffer because they were, in essence, our first line. That's the day the light bulb went on over my head...

[7thNJcoA]

I must clear up that the term cell doesnt appear in any manual nor did I say it does it is just an easier way for me to describe the groups of four men. I apologize for any confusion there but still do you think the CPT can control the movements of all men from behind the line in the center when you have a large body deployed as skirmishers. Personally when It comes to tactics it is easier to see it done and see the correct way of doing it rather than reading books unfortunately we do not have that advantage anymore...

[Mint Julep]

I must clear up that the term cell doesnt appear in any manual nor did I say it does it is just an easier way for me to describe the groups of four men. I apologize for any confusion there but still do you think the CPT can control the movements of all men from behind the line in the center when you have a large body deployed as skirmishers. Personally when It comes to tactics it is easier to see it done and see the correct way of doing it rather than reading books unfortunately we do not have that advantage anymore...


Drew,

Are you saying that we can no longer correctly demonstrate the deployment of a company of skirmishers under the control of a single officer?

If so, you are wrong. I've seen it done repeatedly. I've done it as the captain of a company. It is done through the use of guides (sergeants) and subalterns (Lts.) as the book prescribes. It takes practicing the drill to learn it correctly, which is exactly what Civil War soldiers did.

Are you actually being taught by your unit leaders to do it some way other than the manual describes? If so, I invite you to attend any number of events with me and allow me to show you how it is done correctly.

[tompritchett]

I remember a Cedar Creek a number of years ago, when we advanced past the Heater house with skirmishers 30 yards or so in front. The entire battalion crested the little hill and there were a million Confederates in front of us.

Very rarely have I ever seen skirmishers properly deployed at Cedar Creek. They historically have always been too close to the the main lines. IMHO, the most appropriate way to use them in a reenactment such as Cedar Creek would be have the skirmishers deploy and advance while the main battalions are still forming up coming out of the camps. That way the two groups of skirmishers (Union and Confederate) would be fighting in the middle of the battlefield while the main forces are still making their initial deployments at the edges of the "battlefield". Then when the main formations become visible, the two groups of skirmisher can fall back to the flanks. Just my 2 cents.

[Curt-Heinrich Schmidt]

Hallo!

"Personally when It comes to tactics it is easier to see it done and see the correct way of doing it rather than reading books unfortunately we do not have that advantage anymore..."

Not sure what is being said here.

IMHO, it is a choice to strive to read, study, and replicate what is described in the "books" (manual[s]) as the correct way of skirmishing by company or battalion, or not.

Without getting into personal learning modalities, it can take the combination of desire, "books," practice, and being correctly assertive in doing it.

As with anything proscribed in the manual(s), it comes down to individuals, units, and events as to how much or how little is chosen to be researched, documented, practiced, and used on the field.
And as with anything proscribed in the manual(s), it can come down to individuals, units, and events as to how much or how little is chosen to be done.

Granted, "it" becomes harder to maintain "command and control" the more dense or broken the terrain is, but if the skirmish order according to the manual(s) is maintained, it minimizes the lack of command-and-control through the placement of the captain, lieutenants, and up to the 5th sergeant and guides. And the use of the bugle when line-of-sight may be lost.

But at events where the so-called skirmishers know and practice little or none of skirmisher order other than running around between the two visibly opposed battle lines firing off rounds, not so much.
IMHO, I would see a company deploy as skrimishers, maneuver a bit, and withdraw before the enemy battle line witohut firing a round, or driven- than a loose gaggle of lads popping off rounds for a few minutes ignored by the enemy line

IMHO, partially because that is the culture and tradition of "skirmishing," and partially because the manuals are not studied and used by enough folks' Mental Pictures.

(My compliments to Herr Mint.)

CHS

At Gettysburg on the afternoon of the second day, the entire left flank of the Union line was "held" by a force consisting largely of the 2nd USSS strung out in skirmish order across the base of Big Round Top.

[flattop32355]

...but still do you think the CPT can control the movements of all men from behind the line in the center when you have a large body deployed as skirmishers....

The answer is "Yes, as well as anyone can, and better than leaving it to individual groups of Comrades In Arms to do it independently on their own.

How the individual soldiers would choose to use cover, etc, was up to them, but the commander (captain or whomever in charge of the skirmish line) dictated when and where and how far the skirmish line moved, how it deployed, and how and when it returned to the main body.

That was pretty much his job, after all.

[dustyswb]

A skirmish line started as a larger body; company, regiment, battalion, etc. Just because the men were deployed in a different formation, the chain of command didn't change.

[7thNJcoA]

our unit does it correctly I am not talking about reenacting I was saying that in the war I just couldnt see with all the confusion a capt being able to see everything and control everything from behind the line...

when I say it is easier to understand when you see it I mean just that... To often the descriptions are very vague of events and different maneuvers leaving much too individual interpretation (not always) it would be easier as I said if we were lucky enough to see how it was really done. I am not saying anyone is doing it right or wrong... I am not trying to get attacked here I am just trying to understand things a bit better. My mindset is still set in urban warfare it is difficult to adjust sometimes...

[flattop32355]

I was saying that in the war I just couldnt see with all the confusion a capt being able to see everything and control everything from behind the line....

With anything other than open terrain/good weather/no smoke, there's no way for any commander, be it a company captain or regimental colonel to actually see what all his men are doing. However, he does maintain overall control of the skirmish line and its actions. The individual soldiers will make use of whatever cover is available (something we don't tend to do, as there is no real danger, an excellent stimulus to do things properly), but still move and fire at the discretion of the commander's orders.

With our compressed reenactor battlefields, I doubt we'll ever see a really long, regimental sized skirmish line.

[7thNJcoA]

With anything other than open terrain/good weather/no smoke, there's no way for any commander, be it a company captain or regimental colonel to actually see what all his men are doing. However, he does maintain overall control of the skirmish line and its actions. The individual soldiers will make use of whatever cover is available (something we don't tend to do, as there is no real danger, an excellent stimulus to do things properly), but still move and fire at the discretion of the commander's orders.

With our compressed reenactor battlefields, I doubt we'll ever see a really long, regimental sized skirmish line.

I agree with you... Wouldnt it be a sight to see thought a long skirmish line functioning properly and using cover or firing prone. I always load and fire laying while in skirmish formation if there is not cover and people look at me like im crazy.

[OVI]

Period skirmishing was not modern small unit tactics. I think the other thread relating to dismounted and the interest in that "style of fighting" shows that some reenactors dont like Napoleonic warfare and seek to work around the basics. Sadly, it has been my experience that in many cases, the interest in skirmish fighting (as dismounted anyway) reveals a lack of interest and skill in standard battalion/company fighting in the ranks. It is ironic that when reenacting infantry utilizes skirmishing, the men typically are unaware of the change in tactic and the freedom it gives them to do something more than advance and fire in loose order. We need to utilize and see proper skirmishing at more events where the size of the field allows more than the two sides forming battlelines and blazing away at 50 yards.

Kent Dorr - Ohio
"Devils Own" Mess

[huntdaw]

I think it's important to remember that a captain did not operate in a command vacuum on the field. He had some subalterns on the field also. Lieutenants were there to help with command and control. At many events these positions are left out due to wanting more men on the line resulting in a potential command and control problem for the single individual in the captain's slot.

For example if a company was deployed, the captain had charge of the 1st platoon - the 1st Lt. was in reserve with the second platoon. That alone will make the captain's job quite a bit easier as far as command and control. Combine the subalterns with the NCO's, plenty of drill and some bugle calls and you've got pretty good command and control in my opinion.

[bob 125th nysvi]

we are getting hung up in minutia and not realizing we are all basically agreeing on the same parameters.

For example a Captain deploys his skirmishers. Depending on the situation he decides how many groups of 4 he will deploy and how far in front he wants them to be. He will hand out basic instructions to the Officer/NCOs in charge of the line.

The skirmish line then deploys as instructed and awaits the Captain's order to advance (done via bugle).

Upon the signal the skirmish line advances, each NCO striving to keep his group in contact with the groups to his right and left, and moving in the direction the Captain originally ordered.

Each two man group 'bounds' (for lack of a better term) covering each other and selecting obstacles to move behind (if available) with in established parameters, all the while maintaining contact with the other two man group in their unit.

The NCOs control the tactical advance until they have fulfilled their orders OR they get a signal to change objectives.

Based on information received (or new orders for above) the Captain controls the general advance, direction and movement of the skirmish line. He does not micro-manage the movement of individual groups or soldiers. He relies on the NCOs to correctly interpret his intentions. If they couldn't do that he WOULD NOT have assigned them the task in the first place.

Based on original orders or additional orders received the NCOs manage their group with in their tactical sphere of influence but they don't direct the individual movements of the soldiers UNLESS the NCO has made a tactical decision.

The Captain does not relinquish command of the skirmish line but he also does NOT control individual groups. NCOs DO NOT relinquish tactical command of their group but neither do they instruct each individual soldier on when, how and where to move in every situation. Individual soldiers operating at the general direction of the NCO in charge make tactical decisions in conjunction with their partner (ie: one shouts ready and the other moves to his next spot).

And the skirmish line does not just proceed in blind obedience to orders. They don't just walk up right until some takes a shot at them, they look and listen and hide when appropriate. They don't try to keep advancing on hill "A" if they encounter an significant enemy force or a major terrain obstacle. They send back information.

Everybody above the level of Private has command responsibility which includes conducting any action which will ensure the success of the mission ordered and may also include using some initiative (like securing a significant piece of military terrain) when the opportunity arises.

This is how skirmish tactics are SIGNIFICANTLY different than line tactics. When the company is in line the Captain basically controls EVERYTHING for EVERYBODY. Based on training people will do their jobs but when in the line the Captain tells them where to go, how he wants them to get there, where each person is to be (through the use of hours of drill in formation). The significant differences in the amount of control an officer can exercise directly is exactly why prior to the Civil War and the Crimea there were specialized units in many armies to perform different functions. It is only about 1840-50 that we start to see the concept that a well trained infantry unit can perform both the line combat and tactical reconnaissance (skirmishing) function. And by the end of the CW the pendulum has swung so far that many units were putting half their men into the skirmish line.

[flattop32355]

I think it's important to remember that a captain did not operate in a command vacuum on the field. He had some subalterns on the field also. Lieutenants were there to help with command and control. At many events these positions are left out due to wanting more men on the line resulting in a potential command and control problem for the single individual in the captain's slot.

For example if a company was deployed, the captain had charge of the 1st platoon - the 1st Lt. was in reserve with the second platoon. That alone will make the captain's job quite a bit easier as far as command and control. Combine the subalterns with the NCO's, plenty of drill and some bugle calls and you've got pretty good command and control in my opinion.

Every once in a while, one comes across a post on a thread that is well thought out, well written, direct to the subject, and instructive.

This is one of them.

No mere tip of the hat, here: A full blown doff and bow is due.

[Mint Julep]

Bob,

I would agree with you, but I cannot find any description of NCOs being given any command authority over any sized group on the skirmish line. Corporals are merely file partners on the firing line at this point and not in command. Sergeants are merely guides, actually posting on the line of advance and retreat and helping maintain order along the line ("watch your intervals", "don't get too far advanced"), but at no time are they "in command".

[Pvt Schnapps]

The captain doesn't decide "how many groups of four he will deploy." He deploys a platoon or the whole company. The comrades in battle are a way to get that done. They would only take on a semblance of a tactical unit when at extended intervals.

Cavalry had another way -- simply taking intervals. I suspect the infantry did something like that by simply forming in one rank and taking intervals according to the terrain or placement of the guides. This seems to have been the Prussian practice, as opposed to the more intricate French model.

Something like this seems implied in Sherman's memoirs:

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/sherman/memoirs/general-sherman-lessons-war.htm

"Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover."

[tompritchett]

The captain doesn't decide "how many groups of four he will deploy." He deploys a platoon or the whole company. The comrades in battle are a way to get that done. They would only take on a semblance of a tactical unit when at extended intervals.

What he does do is determine the interval between men. Most reenactors assume that the men are always deployed with an interval of five paces between each man. In reality, whereas 5 paces may have been the default interval, the commander can deploy his skirmishers at whatever interval is needed to cover the area being covered.

[Pvt Schnapps]

What he does do is determine the interval between men. Most reenactors assume that the men are always deployed with an interval of five paces between each man. In reality, whereas 5 paces may have been the default interval, the commander can deploy his skirmishers at whatever interval is needed to cover the area being covered.

Silas will probably chime in on this soon, but the interval between comrades is supposed to remain fairly constant, depending on accidents of the ground. It's the distance between groups of comrades in battle that increases with extended intervals. You don't want the fellows doing the shooting to lose touch with each other. They need to hear "ready" to alternate fire, and they need to be able to rally quickly.

[tompritchett]

Silas will probably chime in on this soon, but the interval between comrades is supposed to remain fairly constant, depending on accidents of the ground. It's the distance between groups of comrades in battle that increases with extended intervals.

When I was referring to intervals between men, I was assuming approximate uniformity in the distances between each man. As far as distances between groups versus individuals, (I am at work and do not have my manuals with me nor the time to look it up on-line) I thought the interval was set by the distance between individuals and then the distance between groups would automatically be that distance times 4. It makes a lot more sense than requiring the commander ensure that his intervals between groups was divisible by 4 (and each man knowing how to divide the group interval by 4) if a non-standard deployment interval was used (either further spread out or condensed). But I have been wrong in the past.

[Mint Julep]

This thread and the one about "realistic size" have brought to mind the time I was commanding a skirmish line at a Perryville event a few years ago. I was directed to pass between our artillery and advance down the opposite side of the hill on the enemy's flank. When I arrived at the artillery position, I was alarmed, confused and dismayed to see that our artillery was somehow on an even line with their artillery. If I had done as instructed, my skirmishers would have advanced behind the enemy artillery against an infantry line in their rear. In addition that dilemma, we were facing a handful of dismounted cav guys, maybe 7 or 8 to my 15 or so infantry, who refused to fall back under pressure. I had my men lie down behind the reverse slope of the hilltop and sent a man back to get me better instructions.

FWIW, my instructions came back, "run over the cav and push forward. ignore the artillery, they aren't placed correctly". My CO later agreed that the position was horribly muddled but we had to follow the scenario as closely as we could.

I'm still baffled about the artillery deployment. Apparently it was an optical illusion to the spectators that they were facing each other instead on a single line.

[bob 125th nysvi]

Bob,

I would agree with you, but I cannot find any description of NCOs being given any command authority over any sized group on the skirmish line. Corporals are merely file partners on the firing line at this point and not in command. Sergeants are merely guides, actually posting on the line of advance and retreat and helping maintain order along the line ("watch your intervals", "don't get too far advanced"), but at no time are they "in command".

are you telling me the only thing your Sergeants do is walk along as a place holder? Then I suspect you are mis-interpreting what you read.

The professional NCO has been the backbone of the Army ever since the Romans introduced formal ranks. He functions in a command role when an officer is not present.

And a skirmish line 100 yards out from the company is where an 'officer is not present'.

To assume that the CW army was somehow an anomaly in the long history of western warfare is just false.

Now again I think that we are arguing over minutia. The command sphere of influence for an officer is his entire unit. And he makes what command decisions he can with the use of the bugle. However in the CW he really is limited when the unit is deployed in skirmish as to specific commands.

And here again we are back to the AAR scenario, reality and reporting are going to be two different things. For example "The company conformed to my commands" BECAUSE the sergeants understood what I wanted and are excellent NCOS.

[bob 125th nysvi]

The captain doesn't decide "how many groups of four he will deploy." He deploys a platoon or the whole company. The comrades in battle are a way to get that done. They would only take on a semblance of a tactical unit when at extended intervals.

He would deploy however men he thought necessary. However I believe in the manual (Casey's) that the groups move out themselves in 4 man groups spreading out before they actually deploy. Unlike today a platoon back then was not specific number of men with a specific command structure but a tactical sub-group underneath a company made up as necessary out of the existing whole.

[bob 125th nysvi]

This thread and the one about "realistic size" have brought to mind the time I was commanding a skirmish line at a Perryville event a few years ago. I was directed to pass between our artillery and advance down the opposite side of the hill on the enemy's flank. When I arrived at the artillery position, I was alarmed, confused and dismayed to see that our artillery was somehow on an even line with their artillery. If I had done as instructed, my skirmishers would have advanced behind the enemy artillery against an infantry line in their rear. In addition that dilemma, we were facing a handful of dismounted cav guys, maybe 7 or 8 to my 15 or so infantry, who refused to fall back under pressure. I had my men lie down behind the reverse slope of the hilltop and sent a man back to get me better instructions.

FWIW, my instructions came back, "run over the cav and push forward. ignore the artillery, they aren't placed correctly". My CO later agreed that the position was horribly muddled but we had to follow the scenario as closely as we could.

I'm still baffled about the artillery deployment. Apparently it was an optical illusion to the spectators that they were facing each other instead on a single line.

you would have been stuck with the unexpected situation and forced to deal with it because the enemy rarely complies with being where he is supposed to be and when shooting real bullets you can't just 'run over them' without significant loss of manpower.

[billwatson2]

It's pretty clear in CW manuals and the various books that amount to "Army Ops for Stupid People" that the sphere of decisionmaking for officers was quite a bit different from the sphere of decisionmaking for noncommissioned officers.

If we could only get that distinction squared away in all phases of our reenacting imagine what a difference it would make.

Having noncommissioned staff take on more than their period-correct share of responsibility is hardly ever the problem. It's usually the other way: Show me the company commander who does not chivvy the private who is holding his weapon incorrectly, thus missing the command from the battalion commander to advance. He's a rare individual. His corporals and sergeants should be squaring that guy away, if it really matters all that much when the battalion is formed up for action. His job is to find out what his company is supposed to be doing and make sure the company does it as part of the battalion, not running drill like a corporal.

It needs to be stressed again that there was a lot of supervision per company, in the ideal world, compared to what we have in our reenacting companies. A captain and two lieutenants; as many as five sergeants; eight corporals, for a 100-man company. That's 16 out of 100 devoted to some level of supervision, a pyramid of command and responsibility, some deciding what action will be taken and the rest making sure it does.

There really isn't any reason why a hundred-man company can't be deployed as skirmishers and controlled, ultimately, by their company commander. They'd have to be pretty much out of sight to be out of hearing of a bugle command. They'd all hear it, and I'd bet they'd be waiting and hoping for "Lie down".... It's a lot of fun moving units by the bugle, a lot better than runners. The runners usually agree, by Sunday afternoon anyway....

[tompritchett]

Unlike today a platoon back then was not specific number of men with a specific command structure but a tactical sub-group underneath a company made up as necessary out of the existing whole.

I would disagree with that statement. If you look at the placement of the CPLs in Hardees, you will notice that the 2 internal CPLs define the break between platoons. The difference between platoons then and not in not in the fixed versus non-fixed structure but in the degree that they could operate independently then versus now.

[Mint Julep]

you would have been stuck with the unexpected situation and forced to deal with it because the enemy rarely complies with being where he is supposed to be and when shooting real bullets you can't just 'run over them' without significant loss of manpower.

Well, I did react appropriately, I think. When faced with a position that was not approachable, I put my men under cover and asked for instructions.

If my objective had been the artillery or the opposing skirmish line, then I could have taken either in flank, as I was the extreme left of the line. But my objective was a line of infantry behind the cav and arty. Those two obstacles were not accounted for in my instructions.

Of course, if it had been real life, I would have directed our artillery to obliterate the dismounted retards and disable the opposing arty. One or two shots of double canister would have done both jobs.

The whole battle devolved for me after this incident and I think I took a hit as soon as possible.